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Summary Findings
Pension  indexation  should  anchor  the  parameters  of  the  pension 
system  to  one  or  more  economic  and  demographic  variables  to 
ensure that the system is implemented in a sustainable way, while 
minimizing distortions affecting important economic choices. Arguing 
that financial sustainability, incentive compatibility and consistency 
across  multiple  government  programs  are  critical,  we  examine  the 
many linkages between the various parameters of pension schemes. 
Finally, we turn to the cost of the insurance dimension of indexation, 
and  suggest  that  option  pricing  techniques  could  be  used  to  price 
indexation guarantees, and that this approach may suggest refinements 
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  Introduction 
Pension system design and operation have been important areas of academic research and 
policy reform for several decades now. Much attention has centred on the parametric and structural 
reform of pensions in response to changing demographics and resultant fiscal burdens. Effort has also 
gone into evaluating and comparing various pension arrangements for their effectiveness in providing 
old-age income security.
1
Public pensions in most OECD countries already do provide for some form of pension indexation. But 
these are often the result of historical accident, rather than deliberative policy design. Governments 
have  manipulated what were initially systematic indexation arrangements to reduce social security 
liabilities in the face of demographic transition, and have revisited the indexation design issue less often 
than they might. While the importance of indexation  has  broad agreement, no detailed analysis 
examines indexation design. This paper aims to fill this gap.  
  One area where there seems to be a consensus is that pensions in payment 
should be indexed to prices or average wages, to insure pension recipients against an erosion of 
purchasing power in old age. The World Bank, responding to the 2008 financial crisis, has recommended 
that governments in emerging economies maximize protection to low income workers by offering flat-
rate minimum pensions and full indexation of benefits (Dorfman et al. 2009). 
Retirement policy, however delivered, has several objectives. Among these is the appropriate insurance 
of participants against unanticipated changes in their economic environment. As well, its design should 
be robust and flexible enough to appropriately maintain its broad contours as the economy within which 
it operates changes. Indexation is an important mechanism for delivering both these: We label them the 
insurance and the anchoring functions. While insurance is a term that is meaningful to most, 
“anchoring” may need some explanation. 
Anchoring means that if an indicator shifts, the value of the pension is appropriately adjusted. Perhaps 
the most obvious indexation target is inflation, but other dimensions are equally important. For 
example, increasing life expectancy has altered the proportionality around work life and retirement, and 
good indexation practice should involve indexing the access age of the pension to increasing longevity. 
Most countries, especially those now facing unprecedented increases in later-life longevity, have found 
                                                 
1 See Whitehouse (2006) for one such example. 2 
that failure to index access age has led to fiscal burdens requiring other adjustments in policy 
arrangements to manage the increased liability. An appropriately anchored retirement policy will 
generate pension programs that are responsive to changing economic circumstances and are mutually 
consistent. In this sense, the idea of anchoring suggests that adjustment rules be transparent and that 
payouts do adjust to dramatic and unanticipated changes.
2
In this paper, we list the various aspects of a pension system that need to be indexed, and examine the 
possible benchmarks that might be used. For example, exactly what metric should be used to gauge 
increasing longevity? We then focus on three underlying considerations, or principles, that indexation 
design should take into account. First, the costs of any guarantee associated with an indexation regime 
should be made explicit, and should not be so large as to outweigh participant value. Second, indexation 
should not lead to unintended redistribution and set up perverse incentives towards saving and labor 
force participation. Third, indexation across multiple government programs and across regulation of 
private programs needs to be mutually consistent. Treating different components of a system differently 
can lead to unintended disparities between programs over time, setting up inappropriate incentives for 
individuals to substitute programs to maximize their income.  
   Appropriate anchoring essentially involves 
recognizing that there are important linkages between the various parameters of a system that get 
indexed as well as parameters that often get neglected.  
These three ideas, while normative, are widely accepted in principle. In practice however, none are 
consistently applied. The fiscal impacts of alternative indexing arrangements are frequently not 
considered (Summers 1982). Implications of indexation for incentives and redistribution are often 
ignored, and different indexation benchmarks are used, apparently arbitrarily, for different components 
of retirement provision policy. A more systematic approach to indexing pensions would allow policies to 
be formulated which align more closely with these principles.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present a typology of the various kinds of pension 
schemes that exist and their current indexation practices. We discuss issues relevant to the practice of 
indexation focusing especially on parameters that need to be anchored and the associated indexation 
benchmarks in Section 2. In Section 3 we elaborate on the principles of indexation policy. We abstract 
away from issues related to design of the underlying pension system and focus only on indexation 
design given the structure of the pension system. Section 4 presents an illustrative model that allows us 
                                                 
2 For convenience, we ignore price and wage deflation in this paper. 3 
to explore the impact of various indexation arrangements on expenditure outflows of governments as 
well as consistency across multiple programs: aspects that we think are critical to well-functioning 
indexation provisions. Section 5 focuses on the cost of the insurance dimension of indexation, an area 
that has received scant attention in the literature. This crystallizes the issue of risk diversification, and 
the efficient allocation of risk. As the value of retirement provision burgeons with demographic shift, 
mechanisms to more efficiently allocate risk between stakeholders may become more valuable. Here, by 
way of example, we introduce the idea of deductibles for  inflation insurance. Finally, Section  6 
concludes. 
 4 
I.  Overview of Pension Systems and Indexation 
There is a range of taxonomies for framing pension analysis. The World Bank has a five-pillar 
approach whereas the OECD has an approach that is based on the role and objectives of each part of the 
pension system.
3
1.1   The Structure of Pension Systems 
  Our approach, for this paper, is closer to that of the OECD, in which pension systems 
are categorized into three tiers (Queisser et al. 2007). The first tier aims to ensure a minimum standard 
of living while the second targets income replacement. The third tier consists of voluntary retirement  
savings. This three-tier structure, along with some alternative policy approaches, is  laid out 
schematically in Figure 1. In the following section, we expand on this framework. 
The first tier comprises basic, flat-rate pensions, either resource-tested or universal. They are 
usually financed out of general tax revenue. First tier schemes are found in most OECD countries, 
although they are less often legislated in poorer countries. For example, only a third of the countries in 
the Asia-Pacific region have well-developed first tiers.
4
The second tier aims at income replacement. Many countries have a public, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
defined-benefit earnings-related system where the value of the pension depends on past earnings and 
contributions. For example, U.S. Social Security pays a retirement benefit that is a non-linear function of 
average lifetime earnings and contributions. Some countries (France and Germany) have a points system 
where workers earn points for each year of their contributions. At retirement, the accumulated points 
  Australia provides an example of a resource-
tested pension: retirees below certain income and assets thresholds are eligible for a flat-rate, tax-
financed pension. The pension payment in resource-tested schemes is completely divorced from 
contribution history or participation in a second tier scheme. By contrast, Japan has developed a non-
means-tested basic pension that is paid with a vesting period of at least 25 years of contributions. The 
payouts depend on the number of years of contributions and not earnings. The basic pension in China 
pays a fixed percentage of average, citywide earnings for each year of coverage.  
                                                 
3 The World Bank approach consists of a non-contributory pillar provided by the government to deal with poverty alleviation, a 
mandatory first pillar which consists of a contributory pension linked to pre–retirement income financed from government 
revenue, a mandatory second pillar which consists of a fully funded savings account. Discretionary savings that provide greater 
flexibility than exists in mandatory pillars are part of the voluntary third pillar. Access to informal support (such as family 
support), social programs (health care and housing) and other individual financial and non–financial assets (such as home 
ownership and reverse mortgages) form part of the fourth pillar. 
4 Pensions at a Glance Asia/Pacific (2009) and OECD countries (2007), OECD. 5 
are multiplied by a pension-point value to convert them to an annuity. Sometimes, the redistributive 
part of a PAYG scheme is explicitly recognized in a “minimum pension”. 



















If the pension from the earnings-related scheme is below a particular minimum amount, it is topped up.  
These are a part of the first tier in the sense of their objective of ensuring a minimum standard of living, 
but institutionally, are a part of the second tier system. Spain is one example of a country that provides 
a minimum pension.  
In recent years, a few countries such as Sweden, Italy, and Poland have transitioned to a notional 
defined contribution system where individual contributions are recorded and credited with a notional 
interest rate. At retirement, the notional capital is converted to a pension payment according to a pre-
determined formula mostly dependent on the life expectancy at  that time. Such schemes, labeled 
“notional defined contribution” (NDC) are also managed by the state.  
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 6 
A few countries have a mandatory pre-funded system where employee and/or employer contributions 
are required to be invested in pension funds run by the private sector. The payout is market-determined 
(as in Australia) or is paid at a mandated rate set by the government (as in Switzerland). Many 
developing economies have DC-type schemes called “Provident Funds”, of which the best known is 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund. While these are DC, they often credit a guaranteed rate of interest 
to member accounts and allow for early withdrawals. 
The third tier covers voluntary savings in schemes offered by pension funds and/or insurance companies 
that pay out a lump sum or annuity at retirement. Governments often provide tax advantages to such 
schemes in order to encourage investment in them. We do not discuss the third tier in this paper. Table 
1 maps the combinations of the first and second tier structures across a range of economies. Across the 
world, the structure of system design varies widely. Some countries means-test general tax-financed 
benefits to those in need while others aim at universal coverage. Poorer countries in Asia have no 
provisions for social assistance, whereas most OECD countries have more than one instrument to deliver 
poverty reduction.  7 
Table 1:  Pension Systems: OECD and Asia 
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Source: Pensions at a Glance (2007) and Asia/Pacific (2009), OECD. 
1.2   Indexation Practice 
Indexation practices are a function of the underlying scheme design and objectives in each 
country. In Table 2, we present the indexation arrangements of first tier schemes, while tier 2 indexation 
is described in Table 3. For minimum or basic pensions, indexing to prices seems to be the norm 
followed by indexing to wages. Very few countries have no systematic policy of indexation and uprate 
benefits in an ad-hoc manner.  In the case of resource-tested schemes, information on indexation of 
thresholds that determine eligibility is scant. Belgium and France index both the thresholds and actual 
pension payment to the same index (i.e. prices and wages respectively), while Australia indexes the 
thresholds to prices, but the pension payment to a combination of wages and prices. The United States, 
on the other hand, does not index the thresholds at all.  8 
Table 2:  Indexation Arrangements of First Tier Pensions 
Minimum/Basic Pensions  





























  None/Ad-Hoc  Prices  Wages  GDP  Hybrid 
Thresholds  U.S.  Australia 
Canada 
Finland 
France     





















A Value adjusted annually as part of the income policy. 
B Value of the basic pension is uprated 
biannually in line with the net minimum wage. 
C Public sector wages. 
D 50 percent changes in price and 
wage indexes. The minimum pension will be abolished in 2009.
EUprating follows CPI until either a ceiling 
of 72.5 percent of average earnings or a 65 percent floor is triggered. In the first case, with CPI rising 
more than wages, indexation follows wages when the ceiling is reached. In the opposite case of wages 
growing faster than prices, indexation follows wages if the 65 percent floor is triggered. 
F  The basic 
pension has a threshold that is price-indexed. In addition, a targeted pension includes the basic pension. 
G 
If nominal earnings growth exceeds 2 percent per year, up to 0.3 percentage points of the excess is put in 
a reserve 
H Average of wage and price index. 
I Annual adjustments to living standard on the basis of an 
index based on consumer prices, net incomes and consumer behavior. 
Source: Cantillon et al. (nd); Pensions at a Glance (2007) and Asia/Pacific (2009), OECD. 
In the case of second tier pensions, countries resort to wage indexation for valorization of contributions, 
and to price indexation for the pensions-in-payment. Countries have recently started moving towards 
hybrid indexation and are using some combination of a price and wage index and sometimes longevity.  
At retirement, a worker may receive payments from both tiers: she may be eligible for a social 
assistance or a means-tested benefit and may draw a pension from the second tier scheme. Pension 
schemes in both the tiers often have their own indexation provisions, sometimes without regard to the 
indexation mechanism in the other tier. Disney and Whitehouse (1991) point out that in the United 
Kingdom, the method of indexing the basic state pension also determines the value of earnings limits 
between which National Insurance contributions are paid. These values in turn have an impact on the 
level of entitlement from the second pillar scheme. In addition, minimum and resource-tested pensions 
coexist as part of the first tier in several OECD countries. Different indexation rules for these schemes 
may lead to overlaps or omissions. For example, in the United States, the thresholds that determine 
eligibility to the resource-tested benefit are not indexed, leading to a very tight assets test over time. 9 
Uprating of thresholds, taxes and benefits can have large implications on the treatment of different 
people.  
Most social security schemes, even if they are not means-tested, have some sort of an earnings test, 
reducing the availability of social security payments to those who continue to work beyond the social 
security eligibility age. But in recent times these rules have been relaxed in a number of countries to 
encourage elderly labor force participation. This allows the elderly to receive social security payments 
while continuing to be in the labor force and earning labor income below certain thresholds. Indexation 
of the earnings-test thresholds, pension access age and earnings-test access age can also influence the 
value of the final pension received. This has not received adequate attention in the literature.  
Table 3:  Indexation Arrangements of Earnings-Related Pensions 
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A There exists a contribution floor that is frozen in nominal terms. 
B If financial conditions allow. 
C The pay of earlier years is valorized in line with the increase in the pensions for public sector workers. 
D Average of individual lifetime earnings-average earnings and economy-wide average pay measured over 
the previous three years). 
E  Real wage bill growth, but at least price inflation (Whitehouse 2006). 
F Change in earnings has an 80 percent weighting and change in prices has a 20 percent weighting. 
G Used to be gross wages subject to an adjustment for increases in the total contribution rate to the public 
scheme. From 2004, a sustainability factor which is linked to the system-dependency ratio. 
H 25 percent 
wages, 75 percent prices. 
I Based on a “health” index that is like the CPI but does not take into account 
the price of products that are deemed to be damaging to people’s health or that are strongly affected by 
foreign factors (e.g., oil). 
J Full price indexation for benefits up to three times the minimum pension, 90 
percent of price inflation for benefits between three and five times the minimum pension, 75 percent of 
price inflation above five times the minimum pension. 
Source: Pensions at a Glance (2007) and Asia/Pacific (2009), OECD; Knuuti (2005). 10 
Box 1:  Inconsistencies in Indexation of First Tier Schemes in U.K. 
The United Kingdom has two first tier schemes:  Basic State Pension (BSP) and Pension Credit (PC).   
The BSP is paid to all pensioners once they have accumulated sufficient National Insurance Contributions 
over their working life. Adjustments to the BSP have been made in line with the increase in prices by using the 
Retail Price Index (RPI) since 1981. Had the BSP been rising with average wages, it would have been more 
than half as high as its actual value in 2007. Whitehouse (2009) points out that in 1981 the BSP was 24 
percent of average earnings and is only 15 percent of average earnings in 2008. People above the age of 80 
in the United Kingdom are entitled to an addition of 25 pence per week to the BSP. This addition has been 25 
pence since the time it was introduced in 1971. Had its value been increased each year in line with the growth 
of average earnings, it would have been worth nearly £5 per week in April 2007. 
The PC is an income-tested payment given to pensioners to achieve a minimum monthly income. The PC is 
uprated using average earnings. With earnings rising faster than prices, there is an ongoing compression 
between the value of the BSP and the PC. 
Source: Sutherland et al. (2008). 
 
 11 
II.  What Should Be Indexed and How? 
In this section, we focus on the question of which parameters of the scheme to index and the 
benchmarks to anchor the promises to. As we conceive it, indexation should not necessarily be confined 
to publicly provided schemes, or to pension payouts. The whole of the retirement system is vulnerable 
to imbalance from economic or demographic change, and indexation policy should therefore be 
considered holistically.  
2.1   What to Index? 
We list below some critical features of a pension system that have an impact on the value of the 
pensions in payment and system. We divide parameters into those that matter during the accumulation 
phase and those that have a bearing on the benefits.  
2.1.1   Contribution Phase 
Social security contributions are typically legislated up to some limit of earnings. If ceilings on 
pensionable salaries are not indexed, then workers will be contributing lower amounts towards their 
pensions. If the ceilings are price-indexed and wages grow faster than prices, there may be a significant 
erosion of their value relative to average earnings. Whitehouse (2009) notes that in 2006 in Canada, 
where price indexation prevailed, the ceiling was only 96  percent  of average earnings. Recently 
indexation of the ceilings to average earnings has been introduced.  
Social security contribution ceilings have their analogues in private occupational pensions, where some 
form of contribution limit is typically legislated. In Australia, non-concessional  and concessional 
contributions (those which might be claimed as tax deduction) are subject to caps. The concessional 
contribution cap (AU$25,000) is indexed in line with the average weekly ordinary  time earnings 
(AWOTE), in increments of $5,000. For those over the age of 50, the annual cap is set at AU$50,000 and 
this cap is not indexed.
5  As of July 2009 the non-concessional contribution cap was six times the 
concessional contribution cap.
6
                                                 
5 http://www.ato.gov.au/super/content.asp?doc=/Content/60489.htm&page=3&H3. 
  In the United  Kingdom, since 2006  there  have been no limits on 
contributions that can be made towards different schemes every year. Tax relief on contributions can be 
6 http://www.ato.gov.au/super/content.asp?doc=/Content/60489.htm&page=4&H4. 12 
obtained up to the full value of labor income, up to a cap. Contributions above this limit are taxed. The 
annual limit is set by the HM Revenue and Customs and as of 2009 the limits till 2016 have already been 
set.
7
2.1.2   Pension Access Age 
  Policy needs to consider indexing these limits in a consistent manner, in view of other thresholds 
that might be a part of the pension system.  
Pension systems have previously been designed under the assumption of constant life 
expectancy. Increasing life expectancy has not been adequately accommodated in these structures. This 
has become critical in recent decades because of the increasing longevity of the middle-aged. Many 
schemes have found it difficult to maintain benefit levels without increasing contributions. Diamond 
(1996) discusses access age indexation as one of the proposals to restructure social security. Age limits 
for retirement in most countries have been increased, but while these adjustments can in principle take 
account of increasing longevity, they cannot deal with declining fertility.
8
A standard age limit for all members may not be adequate as the poor often enter the labor force at 
younger years and a “proportional” work-retiree life may mean different access ages for the rich and the 
poor. Haverstick et al. (2007) introduce the notion of using quarters of covered earnings in the context 
of determining the earliest eligibility age for social security benefits, a suggestion that deserves further 
attention in the access age determination debate. 
  In practice, these changes 
have been ad-hoc and need to be continuously evaluated in light of improvements in longevity. A 
further issue arises when the first and second tier schemes have different access ages. In Australia for 
example, accumulations from superannuation funds (second tier scheme) can be accessed from the age 
of 55, whereas the age-pension (first tier resource-tested scheme) is payable from the age of 65. This 
allows individuals to draw down private savings and qualify for the public program.  
                                                 
7 http://www.pensionsadvisoryservice.org.uk/Occupational_Pensions/Contributions/. 
8 Denmark is one of few countries to have made eligibility age explicitly dependent on longevity. 13 
Box 2:  Trends in Pension Ages around the World 
Declining mortality rates and the related increase in life expectancy is a common pattern around the world. As 
a result, many governments have considered or undertaken significant pension reforms during recent years. 
The majority of OECD countries have a standard pension age of 65 for men (OECD 2007). Traditionally most 
OECD countries have permitted women to receive social security benefits at younger ages than men although 
many are now increasing them to the same age as males. Indeed, European countries are required to do so 
by a 2004 European Union Directive. 
However increases in the pension age are now going beyond the equalization issue. Some current changes 
that have already been announced include:  
1.  The United States is gradually increasing its normal retirement age for social security from 65 to 66 
between 2002 and 2009 and then increasing it again from 66 to 67 between 2020 and 2027.  
2.  The United Kingdom announced in a 2006 White Paper discussing their new pensions system that they 
will gradually increase their state pension age from 65 in 2024 to 68 in 2046. 
3.  Germany is gradually increasing its pension age from 65 in 2012 to 66 in 2024 and then to 67 in 2029.  
4.  Denmark is increasing the age threshold for the public old-age pension from 65 in 2024 to 67 in 2027. 
Furthermore from 2025, the eligibility age will be directly linked to changes in life expectancy at age 60.  
5.  Japan is increasing its age for access to the earnings-related component of its pension from 60 to 65 by 
2025 for males and by 2030 for females.  
6.  Increases in pension age that affect both men and women are being implemented in the Czech Republic, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy and Korea (OECD 2007).  
Source: Knox (2008). 14 
Box 3:  Australian Age Pension: A Case for Longevity Indexing 
Some of the first age pensions were paid by states in Australia: New South Wales (1900), Victoria (1900) and 
Queensland (1908). So they have been around a long time. A national age pension system replaced these 
schemes from 1 July 1909. The first age pension was a modest means-tested payment, which was worth 
around 12 percent of male total average weekly earnings.  
Access age was set at 65, although for women it was reduced to 60 shortly afterwards. Life expectancy for 
those born in 1901-1910 was 55.2 for men and 58.8 for women. It is now 78.5 for men and 83.3 for women. 
This is relevant because it indicates how the probability of receiving an age pension payout at all has 
increased. But a second trend has also emerged, as Figure 2 shows. Life expectancy at age 65, after 
remaining relatively stable for the first seven decades of the 20
th century, has increased substantially in the 
period since.  This is relevant because now those who receive an age pension are expected to receive 
payouts for up to 50 percent longer. Further, the rate of full pension has doubled, to 25 percent of average 
male earnings. 
Figure 2: Life Expectancies for Australians at Age 65 from 1885-2001 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 15 
2.1.3   Benefits Indexation 
In earnings-related schemes, pensions are calculated based on lifetime earnings, or some 
related metric – the best 10 years, for example, or final salary. In these calculations, past contributions 
are typically revalued to wage growth, to ensure that older cohorts are not worse off in a growing 
economy. There are several proxies for this: A standard measure that has been used is the growth rate 
in average covered wage. U.S. Social Security provides for a wage-indexing procedure where the 
nominal earnings of workers in each calendar year are multiplied by its Average Wage Index (AWI). This 
procedure expresses past earnings in terms of earnings at the time the beneficiary reaches age 60.  
First Pension Payment 
The formula for determining the first pension payment has ramifications for the pensions that will be 
paid throughout retirement. In the social security scheme in the United States, the first payment, also 
called the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is a non-linear function of earnings revalued using the AWI. 
Indexing the bend-points of the non-linear function is also critical to keep the formula relevant. Several 
countries such as Sweden, Italy and Poland have made benefit determination depend on cohort life 
expectancy. 
Similar issues arise with occupational pension plans, whether in the public or private sector. Typically, 
occupational plans operate with tax concessions that are linked to tax laws with limits, or ceilings. These 
may apply to annual contributions or lifetime accumulations. Again, these tax thresholds will become 
misaligned with other components of the retirement system if they are not indexed.  
Ultimately, the calculation of the first pension amount should take account of the proposed indexation 
of the pensions in payment. The higher the expected growth rate of the pension payment, the lower the 
pension would have to be for the same expected present value of payout. In the case of phased 
withdrawals, percentage draw downs should be similarly calibrated. 
In most countries, pensions are indexed to prices, wages, or some combination. Indexing 
pensions in payment to prices may protect against loss of purchasing power, but beneficiaries may still 
Pensions in Payment 16 
not be protected against a fall in standards of living relative to the working age population. Indexing to 
average earnings on the other hand may lead to unaffordable increases in costs of providing pensions.
9
The choice between wage and price indexation is frequently determined in practice by the perceived 
role of the payout –  is the primary role of the pension in question poverty alleviation, or income 
replacement?  We treat the indexation of means-tested pensions in more detail below, but it is worth 
noting here that a relativist view of poverty speaks to indexation of tier 1 pensions based on some 
proportion of average wages, since wages provide some guide to community living standards.  
 
In most countries, there is limited legal direction as to the pattern of occupational pension payout, and 
in many cases a flat payout is offered, generating a higher initial payout than would be possible with an 
indexed flow. From a policy perspective, the negative consequence of this is that in later life, a person 
with substantial lifetime resources may become eligible to receive public support, while a more 
moderate and indexed income flow would have avoided this outcome.   
Most pension schemes provide for survivor benefits at a reduced rate. Indexation of survivor benefits to 
the same extent will lead to increased outflows for considerably longer but will provide better 
replacement rates to the spouse.  
Poverty alleviation begs the question of what constitutes poverty. Leaving aside for the moment 
levels of poverty, a more in-principle question is whether poverty is measured according to  some 
absolute standard, or whether it is perceived as relative to community standards. Resolution of this 
question is critical in designing indexation for first tier pensions.  
Poverty Alleviation and Means-Tested Pensions 
An absolute living standard measure is typically calibrated to the ability to buy a particular basket of 
goods and services. But changes in community standards may imply changes in the appropriate 
composition of the basket, in which case a price-indexed pension will gradually fall short of the required 
income. One implication is that retirees of different ages who are mainly reliant on a pension designed 
around poverty alleviation may receive different amounts, because the first payment has been wage-
indexed, but subsequent payouts increase with prices. There is no normative rationale for this result, 
since poverty is usually defined in relative terms, as a proportion of mean or median income. It is 
                                                 
9 Wage indexation may also have an adverse impact on contributions or benefits when the age distribution of the economy 
changes. Alho et al. (2005) suggest a move to wage-bill indexation from average-wage indexation as the former may lower the 
sensitivity of pension contributions to demographic uncertainty. 17 
therefore necessary to determine what ratio is appropriate and then to recalibrate that living standard 
to community living standards as these change.  
In the case of means-tested pensions, it is important to index thresholds that determine eligibility for 
the pension. If the thresholds do not keep pace with inflation or the growth rate of the economy, then 
they may become irrelevant in determining eligibility. In Australia, the thresholds are indexed to prices. 
Means-test thresholds need to be linked to an indicator of average standards of living in the economy. 
Two possible indicators are GDP per capita and economy-wide average earnings.  
The value of the pension must be determined as a proportion of some economic variable. Most 
frequently, average wages are chosen. In Australia the means-tested pension for a single person has 
been set at 25 percent of male total average weekly earnings (MTAWE) although in light of the financial 
crisis, this amount has recently been increased.
10
Box 4:  Notional Defined Contribution Plans:  An Indexer’s Paradise? 
 
Indexation of pension plans reaches what is perhaps its purest form in the canonical design of the Notional 
Defined Contribution Plan. The classical NDC plan is essentially a non-pre-funded defined contribution system 
where notional individual accounts accumulate at a notional interest rate linked to system return. Individual 
accounts are maintained as a book-keeping system, and benefits are annuitized at retirement based on each 
cohort’s expected mortality patterns and system returns.  
From the individual worker’s perspective, a well-specified NDC policy looks similar to a funded DC plan with 
mandatory annuities. That is, the NDC system requires individual accounts, where the fundamental unit is the 
individual, rather than a married couple or family. Every contributor has his own account and makes his own 
contributions and receives his own annuitized benefit at retirement; there is no ex ante redistribution within a 
cohort. From the government’s viewpoint, however, NDC financing in steady-state is more similar to the PAYG 
model, as there is a mandatory contribution rate and each birth cohort’s implicit rate of return on contributions is 
realized only over time. Accordingly, in the NDC plan, each worker builds up a notional capital sum in his 
individual account throughout his working life. In turn, at retirement, this notional accrual is then converted to an 
annuity, using prevailing estimates of returns and projected mortality patterns. Various life payout patterns could 
be specified; an NDC annuity is usually price-indexed, but it may also include escalation clauses to take account 
of rising community standards over time (e.g., an average of price and wage indexation is sometimes used). 
The rate of return on notional accumulations is typically indexed to the aggregate wage bill or some related 
magnitude. This is what is meant by a NDC system’s implicit return. When the labor force is shrinking, as in 
many aging economies (for example Japan), then returns are reduced and may even fall below zero. At 
                                                 
10 The idea of the appropriate wage – mean or median – is itself not straightforward. For may years Japan had a system of 
standard  bonuses which were excluded from the contribution base of social security,  and other payments  (e.g.,  overtime 
allowances, etc.) are also typically excluded. 18 
retirement, each worker’s notional accumulation is converted to a pension payout annuity using a standard 
annuity conversion factor. 
A perfectly constructed notional account annuity should vary with evolving mortality experience, and the benefit 
computations based on rate of change of the covered wage bill. No country adopting an NDC plan has explicitly 
laid out such adjustments ex ante, although some (e.g., Sweden) have committed to contingency rules for 
changing benefits if there are unanticipated increases in longevity (Sunden 2006).  
Any NDC plan that is rigorously followed despite demographic disequilibrium or macroeconomic fluctuations will 
inevitably confront year-by-year deficits and surpluses.  That is, an NDC structure will be indexed to 
accommodate predictable adjustments attributable to increased cohort longevity and macroeconomic fluctuations 
impacting the time path of aggregate contributions. But it will generate low or even negative returns as population 
aging proceeds, unless adjustments are made such as raising the retirement age to offset labor force reductions.  
One poorly-appreciated aspect of a canonical NDC plan is its inability to diversify risks either within or across 
cohorts – all redistribution is indexed out of any discretionary reach. For instance, a cohort that experiences a 
long-term economic depression will pay less money and receive lower retirement benefits than some other 
cohort with a stronger contribution history.  Similarly, a cohort that experiences poor system returns will be 
disadvantaged relative to a cohort with high system returns. As a consequence, one policy objective of social 
security, namely cross-cohort risk spreading, is not readily handled in the NDC context. As a result, adopting an 
NDC may require a separate means-tested safety net to support the poor. More generally, some of the implicit 
subsidies inherent in a conventional PAYG plan are not present in NDC, and if they are socially desirable, will 
require separate implementation.  
Source:  Lu et al. (2008). 
2.2   Which Benchmarks? 
The ultimate value of any payment or threshold will depend on the underlying instrument that is 
used as a benchmark. In this section we present the various benchmarks that are available and the 
trade-offs associated with each. Wage and price indexation benchmarks may initially appear to be clear, 
but on further consideration complexities rapidly arise. For example, with community standards 
indexation, should median or mean wages be used? Or should we use a measure of per capita GDP 
rather than wages?  In this section we offer a brief introduction to these issues, but, as with several 
other indexation topics that we touch upon, evidence is sparse and analytics incomplete.  19 
2.2.1   Which Price Index? 
Price indexation has usually been carried out by benchmarking to the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). There are some variations around this index:  For example, in Belgium pensions are uprated on the 
basis of a “health index” which is the same as the CPI but does not include the price of alcohol or 
tobacco products. The United Kingdom calculates a “Rossi Index” which is the same as the Retail Price 
Index (RPI) but excludes rent, mortgage interest payments, council tax and depreciation costs and uses it 
to update income-related benefits, but not pensions which use the RPI. The use of the CPI as a measure 
of the cost-of-living puts forth questions on two levels: around the accuracy of the CPI in general and in 
measuring price change of the elderly in particular.  
Many analysts claim that consumption bundles of the elderly are significantly different from that of the 
average population resulting in over- or understatement of price change by the CPI. One of the first to 
deal with this question was the Boskin Commission (1994), which found an upward bias in the CPI of 
about 1.1 percentage points every year but no evidence of the likeliness of different groups in the 
population having faster or slower growth in their cost of living than recorded by changes in the CPI. 
Studies on this subject were carried out by Brzozowski (2005) for Canada, Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(2008)  for Australia and Leicester et al. (2008) for the United  Kingdom. The issue continues to be 
unresolved and requires further research before a price index for uprating pensions is decided upon.  
2.2.2   Which Wage Index? 
The choice of an appropriate benchmark to community living standards is more complicated 
than the issue of the relevant price index. Most countries use average wages, but the superiority of 
average wages over other earnings measures (e.g., household income) has, to our knowledge, not been 
adequately explored in the context of pensions indexation. Harmer (2009) discusses the usefulness and 
drawbacks of “household disposable income” and “national accounts”-based measures for determining 
community living standards. It also analyses in some detail, the problems associated with the current 
measure of living standards, the Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE) used to index the age 
pension in Australia. The Review also points out that the Wage Price Index in Australia that focuses 
solely on earnings of individual employees showed lower growth than the MTAWE over the decade from 
June 1998 to 2008. Another unresolved issue is around the choice of means vs. median wages. These 
choices highlight the difference a benchmark can make to benefit values of recipients as well as well as 
outflows on the pension account. 20 
Box 5:  Different Price Index for the Elderly? 
United States:  The Boskin Commission (1994) found no evidence of the likeliness of different groups in the 
population having faster or slower growth in their cost of living than recorded by changes in the CPI.  However, 
they did concede that the benefits of quality change and introduction of new products may diffuse unevenly 
throughout the population and also that the prices actually paid by households may differ apart from just the 
expenditure shares.  They called for further investigation on the subject.  
Canada:  Brzozowski (2005) investigated the variation in household-specific inflation rates to measure the extent 
to which the CPI overstates the true mean inflation rate. He claims that from the mid-1970s till the end of 1980s 
the Canadian CPI overestimated the true inflation faced by seniors by about 50 percent.  He concludes that the 
limitations of the CPI as a measure of inflation are equally present when looking at either the senior or the non-
senior segments of Canadian population. 
Australia: ABS (2008) designed the Analytical Living Cost Indexes to measure the impact of changes in prices on 
the out-of-pocket costs experienced by four kinds of Australian households, one of which were age pensioner 
households and one were self-funded retiree households. They do find notable differences in the expenditure 
weights across different household types. For example, amongst households on the age pension, the proportion 
of expenditure allocated to food is the highest. Health costs are also higher for age pensioners and retiree 
households. It is the change in the prices of these goods that will have an impact on the purchasing power of 
these households and not the CPI overall.  
United Kingdom: Leicester et al. (2008) find that between 1977 and 2008 average inflation for pensioners has 
been virtually the same as that for non-pensioners, but that ranking changes from year to year and differences 
within a particular year may be large. They claim that inflation experience of pensioner households may differ 
depending on the age and income of pensioners. They also find that the basic state pension increased by less 
than pensioner inflation in 2006, 2007 and 2008 along with the guaranteed pension (even though the latter is 
indexed to average earnings).  
 
Source:  ABS (2008); Brzozowski (2005); Leicester et al. (2008); The Boskin Commission (1994). 
2.2.3   Which Longevity Index? 
Longevity presents one of the thorniest benchmarks to decide upon. Should life expectancy be 
calibrated from birth? From some pre-determined “retirement” age, such as 60? Should it be the same 
for men and women? Life expectancy at retirement has traditionally been higher for females leading to 
questions around an appropriate life  expectancy measure for pricing of annuities as well as for 
determining the appropriate access age. Recent research, however, reveals that there is in fact some 
convergence around these mortality rates. And should only access age be calibrated to the longevity 
index, or should payouts be calibrated as well? That is, should the value of a payout from a social 
security defined benefit promise be varied as life expectancy varies? Policy needs to address questions 
around the correct measure of longevity for determining the pension payout. Recent innovations 21 
include the development of longevity indexes by firms such as Credit Suisse First Boston and JP Morgan 
to benchmark, structure and price instruments that deal with longevity risk; yet reliable estimation 
procedures for forecasting changes in longevity are only in the early stages of development. At this 
point, a period table calculation of life expectancy from a given age, such as 60 or 65, linked to access 
age, would seem to be the most practical in determining how access age might be indexed. Perhaps life 
expectancy from the actual date of payout commencement might be an appropriate benchmark in 
determining the value of a periodic payout in systems that recognize sensitivity to the expected present 
value of payouts.  
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III.  Principles 
In this section we abstract from the plethora of indexation specifications encountered in extant 
social security and pension systems, and seek to identify some essential criteria, or principles, which 
should guide pension indexation policy. As illustrated in Section 2, most OECD countries have put in 
place a system of automatic indexation, often written into the law to insulate benefit determination 
from political manipulation. If indexation rules are to be embedded in the law, it becomes even more 
important to ensure that the rules take into account the various concerns about sustainability and 
fairness over what are essentially long-term and often intergenerational contracts.  
It is convenient to begin with a simple list of criteria that well-formulated indexation policies might 
meet, or equivalently, the principles that indexation design should adhere to. Because indexation is a 
design feature of the pension system in general, we focus on those that we think are essential to a well-
functioning pension system, namely financial sustainability, incentive compatibility and consistency 
across government policy. We identify the various ways in which indexation choices may have an impact 
on any of the three principles and thereby highlight the trade-offs in the choices available.  
3.1   Financial Sustainability 
Population ageing is placing pressure on the financial sustainability of social security systems 
(defined benefit or defined contribution); even when from an individual standpoint, their specification is 
actuarially neutral. This fiscal pressure has led to the erosion of benefit promises in many countries, and 
frequently these involve some revision of indexation arrangements, or discretionary changes in 
promises along a dimension of entitlement that could have been indexed, but was fixed nominally, such 
as access age.  
In defined benefit schemes in particular, entitlements are generally quite complex to calculate, and a 
range of unexpected changes – of which the most obvious is increasing longevity – can compromise the 
actuarial equivalence that may have informed the policy’s initial specification. Here, comprehensive 
indexation can help keep the contribution-benefit relationship in actuarial balance. In aggregate, 
however, indexation will not be sufficient to deliver financial sustainability. Different kinds of indexation 
essentially involve a trade-off between higher benefits and financial sustainability; careful consideration 23 
should drive such a choice. For example, wage indexation of the stream of pension payments may mean 
higher benefits for retirees, but also a higher burden for those contributing to the system.  
Indexation works differently depending on whether the scheme is funded or not. Typically, in PAYG 
schemes, contributions from working members finance the benefits of current retirees.  At the level of 
the individual, contribution rates are usually set, at least initially, to bear some actuarial relationship to 
the expected value of benefits. They are (at least approximately) automatically indexed to wages, since 
the social security tax rate applies to wages paid. In the decumulation phase, indexation issues revolve 
around determination of the initial payout and the pensions in payment thereafter. Social security in the 
United States revalues wages to the current wage rate to determine the initial payout and price indexes 
benefits thereafter. If wages grow faster than prices, then the benefits of people retiring later will be 
higher in terms of purchasing power than the benefit of retirees today, although not in terms of 
replacement of earned income. One of the proposals of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social 
Security (2001) was to substitute away from wage indexation to price indexation, thereby reducing 
social security benefits relative to a worker's lifetime wages, thus trading off benefits for  financial 
sustainability. 
Full indexation of a PAYG system, including the internal rate of return (IRR), is found only in a pure 
Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) plan.  Aggregate financial consistency requires that the implicit 
rate of return in the pension promise be the same as the growth rate of the contribution base. 
Adherence to this implies that benefits are automatically indexed to payroll growth, a combination of 
productivity (or wage) growth and labor force participation. There has been wide research over the 
exact structure of the IRR and the indexation mechanism in NDC schemes. While there is substantial 
support for the covered wage bill to be the appropriate measure of IRR, Robalino and Bodor (2007) 
point out that it is appropriate only in restrictive theoretical settings. They propose a new measure for 
the IRR that depends on the growth of the reserves and assets of the system. They also suggest the 
investment of contributions towards the NDC in GDP-indexed government bonds thereby making 
pension liabilities explicit. 
While several countries have introduced NDC structures; all have stopped short of a pure plan, since in 
the presence of demographic transition, this would necessarily deliver very low implicit rates of return. 
In practice, indexation to a wage index is more routine, thus keeping the system broadly consistent in 
terms of promises to the individual, but not sustainable financially without increases in contribution 24 
rates or subsidies from general revenue. Many countries have taken both these actions, and have 
additionally reduced future benefits. 
In Sweden, the NDC has constituted an automatic balance mechanism that uses the notion of turnover 
duration (or the amount of time contribution assets will be in the system before they are paid out) to 
come up with a measure of the assets and liabilities of the system. The IRR is then the rate at which the 
pension liability is indexed to assure that liabilities grow at the same rate as assets. The Swedish system 
also calculates a balance ratio (of the assets and liabilities) on a regular basis. If the balance ratio falls 
below 1, cohort wealth accumulates at a lower rate and the gross rate of growth used to adjust pension 
benefits of retirees also falls by the balance ratio (Settergren  2001). Other countries have other 
adjustment mechanisms. 
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In the case of funded DB schemes, contributions may be pooled into a reserve or a fund. To be able to 
pay out indexed pensions, the fund needs to invest in a mix of debt and equity instruments, possibly 
inflation-indexed bonds. Bikker and Vlaar (2006) claim that those pension funds in the Netherlands, 
which have serious indexation ambitions, need to build up earmarked indexation reserves. In their 
simulations, they find that realizations of unconditional indexation will be far more difficult because very 
large implicit capital buffers need to be shored up. One way of ensuring solvency for such funds is to 
have a mechanism of conditional indexation. In the Netherlands, funds that provide an earnings DB 
pension can grant indexation only if the asset value of the fund is sufficient to cover all future 
obligations (de Jong 2008). 
 
In funded DC schemes, such protection can be construed as a real-annuity bought with the accumulated 
capital at the time of retirement. This usually involves investing the proceeds in inflation-indexed bonds. 
An inflation-protected annuity might translate to lower nominal payments to begin with.  
3.2   Redistribution and Incentives 
Redistribution may be an explicit objective of pension system design,
12
                                                 
11 See Borsch-Supan et al. (2003) for a discussion of the German sustainability factor, and Vidal-Melifia et al. (2008) for a 
comparison of the automatic balance mechanisms in Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan and Sweden. 
 and indexation policy 
may continue with the redistribution put in place by the broader pension policy.  As mentioned in the 
discussion on financial sustainability, social security in the United States uses a wage index for revaluing 
12 For example, the PIA formula in the Social Security scheme in the United States is designed such that a dollar for dollar is not 
returned to people in higher income brackets. 25 
past contributions, although  reform deliberations have considered switching from wage to price 
indexation. While this may achieve financial stability, it does have repercussions on the redistribution 
possible. Pozen et al. (2004) argue that this may be very unfair to low income workers and support wage 
indexation for those in bottom 30 percent of the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) distribution. 
For workers beyond the 30 percent, they suggest adjusting benefits on a sliding scale between full-wage 
indexation and full-price indexation. The latter would be applicable at the highest level of the earnings 
distribution. 
Generous indexation, on the other hand, may also lead to transfers from the poor to the rich as it is the 
rich who have a higher life expectancy. Creedy et al. (1993) illustrate how the two tiers of the benefit 
scheme and the contribution rules in the United Kingdom interact to generate redistributive outcomes, 
and how these interactions are affected by pre- and post-retirement indexation rules. They find that 
among the factors affecting individual entitlements and benefit-cost ratios, differential mortality is 
central. 
A lot has been written on perverse incentives on savings and labor supply caused by high taxation often 
required for welfare policies. Indexation design is no exception. Jaag et al. (2007) argue that moving 
from wage to price indexation has important consequences for implicit taxes and labor market 
incentives of the active workforce. While it is true that the young have significantly greater human 
capital to deal with unanticipated economy-wide changes, incentive effects need to be assessed before 
deciding upon the indexation promise. As it is possible to redistribute by way of explicit transfers, we 
believe indexation policy may well be kept redistributively neutral with minimal distortions on savings 
and labor supply.   
3.3   Consistency across Government Policy 
Pension schemes are usually a part of larger welfare programs covering disability, 
unemployment, health and other social contingencies. Often enough, different welfare schemes index 
payments under different rules. Within a pension system too, different tiers are indexed differently 
engendering incentives to select oneself into the scheme with more generous indexation arrangements. 
An example of this kind is presented in Box 1 in Section 2. Indexation of public pensions with no such 
requirement for schemes that operate in the private sector leads to a potential moral hazard problem 26 
where people may draw down their private wealth and enjoy generous public payouts in later years. 
Good indexation design needs to guard against such possibilities.  
While outside the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize  that indexation design has 
repercussions beyond just welfare system design. Price indexation may lead to a class of people who do 
not gain from anti-inflationary policies. On the other hand, governments might be tempted to engage in 
inflationary policy to reduce the value of its own debt. If the government is financing indexed benefits 
through the issue of bonds, then in times of high price inflation, bond-holders end up subsidizing 
pension beneficiaries. If pension beneficiaries are holders of bonds, then it is not clear who the actual 
recipients of such transfers are.  
It is tempting to think that inflation has been beaten, through inflation-targeting policies, but this is 
probably too sanguine a view. It is true that some OECD countries have put in place inflation-targeting 
policies:  New Zealand (December 1989), Canada (February 1991), the United Kingdom (October 1992), 
Sweden (January 1993), Australia (June 1993) and the European Central Bank covering 16 member 
states of the Euro zone (1998). Graph 1 shows that since the 1990s, with inflation-targeting in place, 
inflation in the three countries (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) has been consistent 
between 0 and 4 percent. Nevertheless, historically inflation has had episodes of low and high rates, and 
the current fiscal stimulus packages have exacerbated already-burgeoning public debt in several major 
economies. This is the kind of environment in which inflation may well increase once more. 
Figure 3:  Inflation Rates in Australia, U.K. and U.S. 
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IV.  A Model of Indexation 
In this section, we present results from a simple numerical model of a pension system designed 
to illustrate the impacts of alternative indexation rules. Our exemplar system is a second tier PAYG 
scheme with a minimum pension as a floor. In this context, we report variations in both financing 
requirements and replacement rates received by pension recipients. We refer to the second tier scheme 
as the earnings-related (ER) scheme in the model. If the outcome from the ER scheme is lower than the 
value of the minimum pension in a particular year for a pension recipient, then the payout will be 
increased to the minimum pension from general tax revenue. We ask how indexation of various 
parameters of both schemes affects outcomes for individuals who might be recipients of both the tiers. 
We also take a holistic look at pension expenditures and examine the impact of indexation design on 
expenditures on account of the PAYG scheme as well as the minimum pension. 
4.1   Pension System Set-Up 
4.1.1.  A PAYG System, with a Minimum Pension 
We stipulate an overlapping generations’ structure in which each cohort lives for 60 adult years, 
the first 40 in the labor force, followed by 20 years in retirement. Death occurs with certainty at 60. 
Cohorts gradually diminish in size, by 1 percent each year. Once the pension system is mature, this 
generates the kind of demographic scenario that many developed nations are facing or will face over the 
next period. This leads us to have an age-dependency ratio of 0.58 by 2057, which increases to 0.68 by 
2060. While such ratios are not unusual in many OECD countries; demographic transition in our model is 
more rapid and is a deliberate creation to highlight the impact of demographic change and shrinking 
workforce on system finances.  
To give a calendar reference point, the first cohort begins to work in 2000, and payouts start in 2040. 
The pension is set at 60  percent  of final salary. Indexation can be set to either prices or wages. 
Contributions are set at 15 percent of gross wages every year.  These numbers are typical of developed 
country PAYG social security policies. While these parameters generate a financially sustainable system 
in a stationary demographic equilibrium, falling fertility generates persistent and significant deficits 
unless parameters are changed. 28 
To this standard structure we add a minimum pension, set at 30 percent of average wages in the 
economy in 2040. It is indexed to either prices or mean wages. There are five equal-sized categories of 
workers (with wages in 2000 corresponding to $1000, $2000, $3000, $4000 and $5000 respectively).
13
Wages and inflation in this model are drawn from a normal distribution. Average wage growth rate is 6 
percent with a standard deviation of 3 percent. Average inflation is 4 percent with a standard deviation 
of 4 percent. We draw 5000 observations of wage-inflation combinations and measure the impact on 
the present value of the fund and on pension outcomes for all five categories of workers.  
  
The wage distribution is important because it has implications for the minimum pension thresholds that 
are a function of average wages, and thus the number of people who qualify for the minimum pension.  
4.2  Outcomes 
We first consider the impact of the indexation of the pensions in payment on the year-on-year 
balance of the fund as well as the present value in 2040. We consider two scenarios: wage and 
indexation. 
Table 4:  Impact of Indexation Design on Finances of a PAYG Scheme 
Indexation  
(Pensions-In-Payment) 
First Year of Negative Net 
Outflows 
Average Present Value of Fund 
(In$ Million 2040) 
Wage   2048  -55898 
 
Price  2046-2053  -30479 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
We find that the year-on-year outflows from the pension fund go negative in 2048 in the case of wage 
indexation, whereas in the case of price indexation they vary between 2046 and 2053. We assume a 
discount rate of 5 percent to calculate the present value of the fund under both indexation regimes. We 
find that the average present value of the fund in 2040 is lower in the case of price indexation, thereby 
implying lower outflows on account of pensions. We present the distribution of the present values of 
the fund in the case of wage and price indexation in Figures4 and 5. 
                                                 
13 While in principle other settings are possible, for example a proportion of median earnings, we do not present outcomes from 
other settings. With this distribution, the mean and the median wage is the same. For a distribution with a greater proportion of 
poor people, the median wage is likely to be much lower. 29 
Figure 4: Present Value, Wage Indexation 
($ Million) 
Figure 5:  Present Value, Price Indexation  
($ Million) 
   
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
From the figures, we find that the distribution of present values under wage indexation is skewed more 
to the left, indicating that outflows are higher in the case of wage indexation. While price indexing is less 
expensive than wage indexation, it also implies lower replacement rates. The replacement rate in case 
of wage indexation stays a constant 56 percent of the working-age population wage throughout the 
period of retirement (2040 to 2060 in our model), whereas in the case of price indexation it falls to 47 
percent in 2050 and further down to 39 percent in 2060. 
Price and wage indexation also imply different outcomes for different cohorts. Table 5 presents the 
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Table 5:  Pension Values for Successive Cohorts 
  Value of the Pension in 2040 
(Current Dollars) 
Value of the Pension in 2041 
(Current Dollars) 
Price Indexation     
Retired in 2040  8927  9376 
Retired in 2041    9356 
Wage Indexation     
Retired in 2040  8927  9493 
Retired in 2041    9356 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
A person retiring in 2040 will have the same pension payment in the first year regardless of the 
indexation regime as that is a function of final year’s salary. However, as compared to a person retiring 
in 2041, the 2040 retiree may do better or worse depending on the wage and price outcome. In the 
illustration in Table 5, we find that on an average, the 2040 retiree does far better than a 2041 retiree 
under wage indexation, than under price indexation.  
Lower pension outcomes matter the most for lower income groups, who are more likely to qualify for 
the minimum pension. We define the top-up as the difference between the minimum pension of that 
year and the pension from the second tier earnings-related scheme. We find that people in the $1000 
wage group will always qualify for a minimum pension and the average amount of top-up required in 
2040 is around $3,438 per person. By 2050, the average top-up includes not only the outflows on the 
minimum pensions of the 2040 cohort, but also all the other cohorts who retired between 2040 and 
2050. These outflows differ depending upon the indexation rules of both: the second tier earnings-
related scheme and the minimum pension thresholds. If the thresholds are not indexed, or indexed to 
prices, while the ER pension is indexed to wages, then fewer people will qualify for the minimum 
pension. On the other hand, if the ER pension is indexed to prices, while the minimum pension 
thresholds are indexed to wages, more people may find themselves eligible for the top-up.   
If the outflows on the earnings-related pension exceed the inflows or if greater numbers of people are 
now eligible for a minimum pension, the expenditure will have to be financed out of tax revenues. We 
examine the average outflows out of tax revenues under different indexation rules of earnings-related 
and minimum pensions.  31 
Outflows on account of the ER pension are higher when the ER pension is wage-indexed as shown in 
Table 6.  The ER fund goes in the negative only in 2048 (as shown in Table 4) and therefore there are no 
outflows from that fund in 2040 under either indexation rule. 
Table 6:  Outflows on Earnings-Related Pensions ($ Million) 
  2040  2050  2060 
Wage  0  4079  33359 
Price  0  2613  24128 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
As mentioned earlier, outflows on minimum pensions will depend on not only their indexation rule but 
also of the ER pension. This is because generous indexation of the ER pension will ensure that fewer 
people qualify for the minimum pension. If the ER pension is price-indexed, and the minimum pension is 
wage-indexed, over time more people may end up qualifying for the minimum pension, leading to 
greater outflows. 
 
Table 7:  Outflows on Minimum Pensions ($ Million) 
  2040  2050  2060 
ER Pension Indexed to Wages 
Minimum Pension: Wage  34  643  2094 
Minimum Pension: Prices  0.00  0.17  0.74 
ER Pension Indexed to Prices 
Minimum Pension: Wage  34  764  3060 
Minimum Pension: Prices  34  445  958 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
As shown in Table 7, by 2060, the outflows are highest when the minimum pension is indexed to wages 
and ER pension to prices, followed by a system where both minimum and ER pensions are indexed to 
wages. Outflows on the minimum pension are lowest when the minimum pension is indexed to prices 
and the ER pension to wages because greater numbers of people receive pensions above the minimum 
pension limits.   32 
The total outflow for the government is the sum of outflows on minimum pensions and ER pensions. 
While the government may lower the outflow by price indexation of the ER pension, it may have to pay 
out the minimum pension to a greater number of people, in which case, the total outflows may not be 
that much lower. 
Table 8 presents the average outflows on ER and minimum pensions under different indexation 
arrangements. We add the spending on the minimum pensions of the 2041 retiree cohort to the total 
spending on the ER pensions.  
Table 8: Total Outflows on Minimum and Earnings-Related Pensions  
Under Different Indexation Arrangements ($ Million) 
  Total Outflows (Minimum Pension + ER Pension) 
  2040  2050  2060 
Minimum Price, ER Wage  0  4079  33360 
Minimum Price, ER Price  34  3058  25086 
Minimum Wage, ER Wage  34  4721  35453 
Minimum Wage, ER Price  34  3377  27188 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The highest outflow in 2060 occurs when the minimum pension and the ER pension are wage-indexed, 
followed by a system where the ER pension is wage-indexed while the minimum pension is price-
indexed.  
In conclusion, we find that wage indexation of the second tier pension is more expensive than price 
indexation but delivers higher replacement rates. Wage-indexing the minimum pension implies that 
more people qualify, especially if the second tier pension is price-indexed. If the minimum pension is 
indexed to median wages, in situations where the wage distribution consists of more people at lower 
incomes, outflows would be lower but would also imply lower pension income for poorer recipients.  
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V.   Cost of the Indexation Guarantee 
Our discussion so far has focused on the notion of indexation as an anchor to anticipated 
economy-wide changes. While an annuity with an escalation factor set to expected inflation (or 
expected nominal wage growth) might be one solution, it still does not cover beneficiaries against 
unexpected inflation (Doyle and  Piggott 2002). Indexation, on the other hand, is insurance against 
unanticipated changes in the economy as well. An indexation promise can be construed as a guarantee 
against certain specified events such that a payment is made only if the contingency occurs.  
Guarantees on individual accounts in DC systems have been well explored in pension literature. These 
include minimum benefit guarantees and minimum rate of return guarantees. In the case of the former, 
participants are assured of a minimum level of benefit, irrespective of the actual performance of their 
individual account. (e.g., Chile). In the case of the latter, participants are assured a minimum rate of 
return on their investments (e.g., Uruguay). In either case, the guarantee is not “free” just because 
governments shoulder the burden. Feldstein and Samwick (2001) talk about a “real principal guarantee” 
under which participants are guaranteed their lifetime contributions into the DC account adjusted for 
inflation. They value such a guarantee by projecting what pension guarantee payments might be 
according to a set of stochastic assumptions and take their expectation. Several papers have explored 
risk-neutral valuation techniques to “price” the guarantee (Pennachi 1999, 2000; Fischer 1999; Zartia 
1994). Lachance and Mitchell (2003) provide five examples of guarantee designs and their costs as well 
as alternative financing options for each.  
These guarantee pricing techniques can be applied to price indexation insurance. One example of 
indexation insurance is against inflation. Bodie (1990) was the first to identify the insurance contract 
against $1 inflation as a European call option on the consumer price index. He developed an indexation 
contract with a deductible such that the contract compensates the holder only for inflation above a 
specified rate of i per year. The exercise price on the option is then the “deductible”. He found the price 
for this contract using the standard Black-Merton-Scholes valuation methodology. This idea was 
developed further by Formica and Kingston (1991). They develop a “real value protection” concept of 
inflation insurance whereby a fixed nominal escalating annuity would be the norm  and inflation 
insurance would kick in only if that usual escalation factor proved unsatisfactory at a point in time. This 
way the annuitant would be protected against erosion in purchasing power if inflation continues to be 
high but just below the deductible. This insurance is usually cheaper than full insurance as the escalation 34 
factor is built into the contract and it takes a number of years for the inflation points to accumulate 
beyond the deductible.  
Piggott and Doyle (1998) present the payouts calculated by incorporating the cost of partial inflation 
insurance for a range of real value protection factors and inflation volatilities. They find that the initial 
payout on an annuity with a 20 percent inflation deductible is about 14 percent higher than that on a 
fully indexed annuity. An escalating annuity therefore may be cheaper in many instances than full 
insurance coverage. A particular example of alternative cost of living insurance regimes occurs when 
choosing between wage and price indexing of pensions in payment. As Whitehouse (2009) points out, it 
may be desirable to allow people to choose between a lower initial payment with wage indexation and 
higher payout with price indexation.  
While this analysis has been towards annuities bought with accumulations from a DC individual account, 
the principle of valuing inflation insurance can be extended towards PAYG DB systems as well. One way 
of implementing this is to ask what the sum-total of the inflow of contributions would have to be if a 
cohort retiring in a particular year needs to be given an escalating annuity with different deductibles.  
In an era of massive demographic upheaval, where governments are resorting to changing indexation 
promises to curtail pension expenditure, valuing of the indexation benefit may prove very useful. In case 
of second tier systems, instead of guaranteed price indexation, governments could only provide for 
escalating payments and leave it to individuals to buy the amount of real value protection (or 
deductible) they find most comfortable. This way, the cost of “insurance” is paid for by individuals, but 
the cost of anticipated inflation is borne by taxpayers.  
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VI.   Conclusions 
Indexation of pensions to safeguard against a fall in purchasing power in old age is a ubiquitous 
phenomenon in most OECD countries and several developing nations as well. While there is widespread 
acceptance on the importance of indexation, academic and policy deliberations on its design and 
implementation are scant.  
In this paper we examine indexation design in a holistic manner and stress the importance of anchoring 
indexation policy to one or more economic and demographic indicators so that pension parameters 
adjust appropriately to changing circumstances. We focus especially on the various aspects of a pension 
system that have a bearing on the final pension received by beneficiaries. This includes not just the 
pensions-in-payment, but also contribution ceilings, pension access-age, revalorization formula, first 
pension payment formula and means-test thresholds that determine eligibility to first tier pensions.  We 
then identify the issues around the relevant benchmarks that get used for indexation and point out that 
the question of the most appropriate benchmark has yet not been resolved in many instances. For 
example, consensus around a separate price index for the elderly, or the use of mean vs. median wage 
has yet to be arrived at. We then emphasize some guiding principles that might inform indexation 
policy: financial sustainability, incentive compatibility and consistency across government policy. 
We present a simple model of indexation where we are able to show the interactions between 
indexation rules of the first and second tiers of a pension system and point out that these interactions 
have a bearing on which individuals find themselves as recipients of both tiers and therefore the 
ultimate replacement rate as well as outflows from general tax revenues.  We find that wage indexation 
of the second tier pensions is generally more expensive but provides a higher replacement rate. Wage 
indexation of the first tier minimum pension and price indexation of the second tier pension imply that a 
lot more people will find themselves eligible for the minimum pension over the course of retirement.  
At the risk of oversimplification, we conclude that  
•  Aspects of pension policy that relate to accumulations should be indexed to some variant of 
wages. 
•  Second tier schemes that aim for income-replacement could be indexed to prices. 
•  First tier or poverty replacement schemes should be indexed to community standards that 
include measures such as wages or per-capita GDP. 36 
•  Recommendations around longevity indexation are more difficult to crystallize. But the idea that 
access age should be linked to some measure of longevity has great intuitive appeal and 
warrants further research. 
As with any guarantee, we think governments should price the indexation guarantee. We look at the 
guarantee pricing literature that revolves around minimum benefit and rate of return guarantees on 
defined contribution individual accounts and believe that these techniques could be utilized to price the 
indexation guarantee. With a price, governments will then be able to offer escalating payments and 
leave it to individuals to buy the amount of real value protection or deductible they find most 
comfortable. This allows for risk diversification between various stakeholders of the pension system and 
is extremely valuable as governments grapple with burgeoning retirement payouts. This is left for 
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
Pension  indexation  should  anchor  the  parameters  of  the  pension 
system  to  one  or  more  economic  and  demographic  variables  to 
ensure that the system is implemented in a sustainable way, while 
minimizing distortions affecting important economic choices. Arguing 
that financial sustainability, incentive compatibility and consistency 
across  multiple  government  programs  are  critical,  we  examine  the 
many linkages between the various parameters of pension schemes. 
Finally, we turn to the cost of the insurance dimension of indexation, 
and  suggest  that  option  pricing  techniques  could  be  used  to  price 
indexation guarantees, and that this approach may suggest refinements 
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